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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890145-CA 
v. : 
FRANK DAVID GENTRY, : Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of a third degree 
felony in the Fifth District Court. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear this case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did defendant waive his objection to the trial 
judge's failure to disqualify himself by failing to raise it 
sooner and by failing to take steps to obtain a ruling on the 
belated motion? 
2. Did defendant waive consideration of his motion for 
a new trial when he failed to object to the court's failure to 
rule? 
3. Did the trial court err by refusing to allow 
withdrawal of defendant's guilty plea that was voluntary, knowing 
and intelligent? 
4. Where the trial court found that defendant's guilty-
plea was valid, are his claims of ineffectiveness of counsel for 
failing to investigate, failing to withdraw from representing 
defendant when he chose to plead guilty, failing to move to 
disqualify the trial judge, and failing to assert certain 
defenses waived? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of all relevant authorities is set forth 
within the Argument portion of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with theft by deception, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 
(1978); and criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (1978) (R. 26-28). After 
a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on theft, a third 
degree felony; and criminal trespass (R. 24, 25). 
On January 25, 1989, a trial commenced before the 
Honorable J. Philip Eves, sitting without a jury (T. 4-8). After 
the close of the evidence and just prior to closing arguments, 
defendant changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of theft, a 
third degree felony (T. 181). The State dismissed count two (T. 
187). Judge Eves stayed imposition of sentence and placed 
defendant on 18 months probation (T.177,181). 
It appears that this appeal could soon become moot. 
Defendant's 18 month probation is nearly expired. In Holmes v. 
United States, 383 F.2d 925, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court held 
that an appeal was moot where the sentence was served and there 
were no collateral disadvantages which the appellant might incur 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant and his five siblings each inherited an equal 
share of the Fremont Ranch from their parents (T. 11-12, 19). In 
1981, the property was partitioned and defendant's share was 
purchased from him for $21,833 (T. 13, 20, 41, 63-64, 127). 
After the partition sale, even though he retained the 
money given him for the land and knew the owners wanted him off 
of the land, defendant continued to use the ranch (T. 72-73, 
130). In 1983, defendant retained an attorney and attempted to 
purchase a portion of the ranch from two of the owners (T. 76-7 7, 
ex. P-20). In 1986 and 1987 defendant and his son, codefendant 
Curtis Gentry, received payments from Carlisle Stirling for 
grazing of the ranch property (T. 83-85). The family members who 
then owned the ranch did not give defendant or his son permission 
to use or to lease the ranch to others (T. 20-21, 41-42, 48-49, 
ex. P-3 at 3, 64, 67, 72, 99). The owners did not receive any 
part of the money collected by defendant and his son (T. 64, 67, 
147, 159). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant did not raise his claim that the trial judge 
should disqualify himself until after the motion to withdraw the 
plea had been under advisement for several months. Then, when 
defendant received a ruling on this motion that was issued four 
days after he filed his motion to disqualify, defendant did not 
Cont. as a result of the conviction. Here, if defendant 
satisfactorily completes his probation, the case will be 
dismissed. At that time there will be no collateral consequences 
remaining, and no reason to continue this appeal. 
object to the failure to rule. In this circumstance, defendant's 
claim is waived. 
Defendant's motion for a new trial was filed only four 
days prior to the ruling denying his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. Again, defendant did not object to the ruling on 
the motion to withdraw his plea or otherwise notify the court 
that there was an outstanding motion to be ruled upon. In this 
instance, this case should not be remanded for a ruling on the 
motion for a new trial. 
The record supports that defendant's plea was 
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Defendant sat through the 
entire trial before pleading guilty. The record discloses that 
he heard and understood the plea agreement. The trial judge 
properly refused to allow him to withdraw his plea. 
Defendant's guilty plea waives his ineffectiveness of 
counsel claims because they do not go to the validity of his 
plea. Even if defendant had not waived these claims, the record 
discloses that trial counsel was effective. Defendant fails to 
establish that counsel rendered a deficient performance that 
prejudiced him. His conviction should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL 
JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED HIMSELF; 
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO 
DISQUALIFY THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
After defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and 
after the trial judge took the motion under advisement, defendant 
filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge. This motion 
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arrived in the district court four days prior to the judge 
issuing his ruling on the motion to withdraw the plea. After the 
judge issued his ruling that defendant would not be allowed to 
withdraw his plea, defendant did not object to the ruling. 
Defendant also did not advise the judge that he had failed to 
rule on the motion to disqualify. Under the circumstances of 
this case, the judge did not err in failing to rule on the motion 
to disqualify because defendant did nothing to bring the motion 
to the judge's attention. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29(c) (Supp. 1989) provides that 
if a defendant files an affidavit alleging bias and prejudice on 
the part of the trial judge, the judge shall proceed no further 
until the challenge is disposed of. The affidavit must be filed 
"as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or the 
bias or prejudice is known." Icl. In this case, defendant did 
not file his motion to disqualify Judge Eves until the motion to 
withdraw the plea had been taken under advisement and the judge 
was ready to rule. Defendant does not indicate when he 
discovered that Judge Eves might be a witness if he received a 
new trial. He certainly does not allege that he learned of this 
fact just prior to filing the motion. 
Further, when defendant received his copy of Judge 
Eves' ruling denying the motion to withdraw the plea that 
contained no ruling on the motion to disqualify, it was incumbent 
upon defendant to object to that ruling in the trial court. 
Defendant's failure to notify Judge Eves of the oversight should 
bar defendant from raising this issue on appeal. This is 
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analogous to the situation where a defendant fails to object to 
the admission of evidence at trial or objects on some ground but 
not the ground asserted on appeal. See State v. Barella, 714 
P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986); and State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 
(Utah 1985). This situation is also analogous to the situation 
where a defendant files a motion for a new trial and fails to 
obtain a ruling on the motion prior to appeal. In that instance, 
this Court could refuse to consider the appropriateness of the 
motion. See State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1984). 
This Court should refuse to consider whether the trial court 
should have ruled on the motion to disqualify himself in this 
case because defendant has waived the issue by failing to bring 
it to the attention of the trial court. 
Defendant's guilty plea also operates as a waiver of 
this claim. A voluntary guilty plea waives all claims of error-
occurring prior to the plea except jurisdictional claims. State 
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). The trial judge's 
failure to disqualify himself is not jurisdictional. While the 
existence of bias and prejudice relieves the individual judge 
from presiding over the controversy, the actual jurisdiction of 
the court is unaffected. Thus, defendant waived his claim if 
this Court upholds his guilty plea. 
Furthermore, defendant's motion to disqualify Judge 
Eves was not made on ihe basis of bias or prejudice. Rule 29, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-29 (Supp. 1989)(repealed July 1, 1990), 
contemplates a situation where the judge may lack the 
impartiality required to fairly judge the issues in the case. 
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"Bias and prejudice mean a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will 
toward one of the litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism 
toward one." Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1948). 
Defendant wants Judge Eves to appear as a witness if the case is 
retried. Because Judge Eves determined that defendant would not 
be allowed to withdraw his plea, no new trial will be held. 
Defendant is not prejudiced by the judge's failure to disqualify 
himself because the judge is not going to be a witness in this 
case. 
Defendant argues that it is troublesome that the judge 
was the factfinder at trial and that he did not agree to waive 
the jury. He states that he cannot be sure that Judge Eves did 
not rely on some fact that he might have known about the 
partition sale to find that the evidence supported his plea. 
This assertion might be valid if Judge Eves did attend the 
partition sale and if the validity of the partition sale had been 
questioned at defendant's trial. Notwithstanding that current 
counsel would like to raise the issue of the validity of the 
sale, trial counsel did not raise any questions concerning the 
validity or facts of the partition sale itself. The fact that 
defendant no longer owns an interest in the land because of that 
partition sale was only disputed by defendant's claim of some 
adverse or prescriptive possessory interest obtained through his 
continued use of the land. Defendant conceded that the partition 
occurred and that he accepted money for his interest in the land. 
Thus, Judge Eves was not called upon to find anything with regard 
to the validity of the sale and defendant's concerns are 
unfounded. 
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Furthermore, defendant did waive the jury. Defendant 
quotes only the portion of the transcript that might be 
interpreted to support his position. After the exchange quoted 
by defendant, however, the following occurred: 
THE COURT: Mr. Frank Gentry has throughout 
these questions nodded in agreement with each 
of the answers or answered vocally. And the 
record should reflect that he appears to be 
in total agreement with what has been 
presented. 
Are you in agreement, Mr- Gentry, with 
what has been presented here in the court? 
MR. F. GENTRY: I do. 
(T. 7-8). The portion of the transcript quoted by defendant is 
taken out of context. The questioning of the defendants 
concerning the jury waiver prior to the material quoted by 
defendant also supports that defendant knew he was waiving the 
jury: 
MR. SPAFFORD: And you understand that if you 
waive it, you waive that right to the trial 
by jury? And do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANTS: (No audible response.) 
MR. SPAFFORD: As a substitute for the jury, 
Judge Eves would act as the trier of fact? 
THE COURT: Mr. Gentry, I'll have to ask you 
to answer vocally. 
MR. C. GENTRY: Yes. We do understand that. 
THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Spafford. Just a 
second. 
Mr. Frank Gentry, are you understanding 
these questions? 
MR. F. GENTRY: Yes. 
(T. 5). When read together with all of the conversation 
regarding waiver of the jury and exclusion of the witnesses, 
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defendant's "no" response cannot be read to mean he did not want 
to waive the jury. 
Unless this Court finds that defendant should be 
allowed to withdraw his plea, there will be no trial and Judge 
Eves cannot be a witness. For these reasons, and because the 
motion to disqualify was untimely filed, even if the judge 
technically violated Rule 29 by not ruling on the motion, there 
was no prejudice; and there is no reason to remand the case. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED CONSIDERATION OF HIS MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL BY FAILING TO PURSUE THE 
MOTION IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
On August 28, 1989, four months after he moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea and four days prior to the court's 
ruling on that motion, defendant filed a motion for a new trial. 
The motion for a new trial claimed that the 1981 partition sale 
of defendant's interest in the ranch was void or voidable due to 
irregularities, thus, the sale was an invalid basis for a 
conviction of theft under the facts of this case. There is no 
ruling or any other indication in the record that the court ever 
considered the motion. Defendant claims on appeal that the trial 
court erred in not ruling on the motion and requests a remand for 
a ruling. Defendant waived consideration of the motion by 
failing to seek a ruling from the trial court, and this Court 
should refuse to remand the case for further proceedings. 
This case was on appeal when defense counsel sought a 
stay to allow the trial court to consider a motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea (R. 157). This was done in apparent recognition 
of the principle that this Court will not consider the validity 
-9-
of a guilty plea unless the defendant first moves to withdraw the 
plea in the trial court. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 
1311 (Utah 1987). Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court will not 
rule on the propriety of a motion for a new trial where the trial 
court has not ruled on the motion. State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d 
751, 753 (Utah 1984) . 
The Utah Supreme Court did not remand the Fierst case 
for consideration of a motion for a new trial that had not been 
ruled upon by the trial court. The Court had this to say: 
Finally, and most importantly, there* is no 
indication in the record that this memorandum 
was ever brought to the trial court's 
attention, much less passed upon. It merely 
appears in the file along with various appeal 
documents dated the same day. Unless such an 
issue is raised before the trial court, it 
cannot be considered here for the first time. 
Id. at 753 (citation omitted). In this case, defense counsel did 
nothing to bring the motion for a new trial to the trial court's 
attention. There is no indication in the record that Judge Eves 
was even aware that the belated motion was filed. When counsel 
received a copy of the September 1, 1989 ruling which did not 
include a ruling on the motion for a new trial, it was his 
responsibility to request consideration of the motion. This is 
especially true where this appeal was stayed at the request of 
defense counsel to allow the trial court to consider and rule on 
defendant's motion to withdraw the plea. The failure to object 
to Judge Eves' ruling should bar defendant from obtaining another 
remand for consideration of the motion for a new trial. 
This Court may also refuse to remand this case because 
the motion for a new trial was untimely. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
24(c) (1978)(repealed July 1, 1990) requires that a motion for a 
new trial be filed within 10 days of the judgment. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Fierst, 692 P.2d at 753, an untimely 
motion for a new trial could be denied for that reason alone. 
See also State v. Day, case no. 890346-CA, slip op. at 2 (Utah 
Ct. App. filed Feb. 1, 1990)(unpublished opinion). Defendant 
alleged no ground requiring the trial court to allow the motion 
to be filed out of time. For this reason, this Court need not: 
remand this case for consideration of the motion for a new trial. 
Finally, in his Statement of Facts, defendant 
repeatedly refers to an affidavit of Ruby Jane Roberts dated 
November 30, 1989 which he includes in his brief at Addendum A. 
See App. Br. at 2-5. Also included in Addendum A of his brief 
are a letter purportedly written by a Ken Chamberlain, an order 
from the Sevier County Probate Court, and a transcript of 
proceedings in the probate court. Defendant asserts in footnote 
2 of his brief that he would have presented these facts to the 
trial court in support of his motion for a new trial if the court 
had considered the motion. The affidavit was not even signed 
when defendant filed his motion for a new trial. Neither the 
affidavit nor the other items contained in Addendum A of the 
brief were filed in the trial court. They are not part of the 
record on appeal. All references to this affidavit and the 
attachments are inappropriate and irrelevant and should be 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
This case went to trial on January 25, 1989. After all 
of the evidence had been presented on both sides, and just prior 
to closing arguments, defendant decided to accept a plea bargain. 
The State agreed to dismiss the criminal trespass charge if 
defendant pled guilty to third degree felony theft. Defendant 
agreed to probation on the condition, inter alia, that he must 
stay away from the Fremont Ranch. Imposition of sentence was 
stayed pending successful completion of probation. 
After he pled guilty, defendant filed a notice of 
appeal. He then moved to stay the appeal so that he could file a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On April 6, 1989 defendant 
moved to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 117). He raised three 
issues: (1) he did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
waive his right to a jury trial, (2) he did not understand that 
by pleading guilty he stood convicted of a felony, and (3) he was 
denied his right to a preliminary hearing on the amended charge. 
At the initial hearing on his motion, on May 1, 1989, defendant 
added a fourth issue: (4) he did not understand the elements of 
the crime in relationship to the facts. Judge Eves took the 
motion under advisement and continued the hearing on the fourth 
issue (R. 199, 232) . 
Neither defendant nor his attorney appeared at the 
August 7, 1989 hearing (R. 209). Judge Eves gave defense counsel 
15 days to file a memorandum and gave the prosecutor 10 days to 
respond (R. 209). On September 1, 1989 Judge Eves denied the 
motion to withdraw the plea (R. 230-34). 
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On appeal defendant claims that Judge Eves abused his 
discretion in refusing to grant the motion to withdraw his plea. 
He claims his plea was unintelligent, unknowing and involuntary 
for four reasons: (1) he did not understand the elements of the 
2 
crime in relationship to the facts, (2) he had a hearing 
impairment, (3) there was no affidavit of defendant supporting 
3 
his plea, and (4) he did not understand the plea agreement. 
Defendant's arguments are contradicted by the record and the 
trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
A defendant is not entitled to withdraw a guilty plea 
as a matter of right. State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 
(Utah 1987). This Court should not interfere with the trial 
court's decision on a motion to withdraw a plea unless the judge 
clearly abused his discretion. State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 
422, 424 (Utah 1987). The burden is on the defendant to 
establish good cause for the motion, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6(2)(a) (Supp. 1989), and to establish on appeal that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the motion, State v. 
Larson, 560 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1977). Defendant has failed to 
carry his burden in both instances. 
Defendant attended an entire trial in which all of the 
evidence supporting a conviction of theft was presented. The 
Defendant also argues in a separate subpoint that the 
trial court's ruling that the record as a whole establishes that 
defendant understood the facts in relationship to the elements of 
the crime was incorrect. A discussion of this assertion will be 
included in the discussion of reason (1). 
3 
While defendant's approaches to these arguments has 
shifted in focus somewhat from the documents filed in the trial 
court, they appear to have been raised there, even if only 
briefly. See R. 117-32, and 243-49. 
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lower court ruled at the time of the plea, and in the order 
denying the motion to withdraw the plea, that this record 
established that defendant was fully informed of the facts upon 
which his guilty plea rested (T. 181, R. 232-33). The evidence 
presented at trial supported a conviction of theft (R. 233). 
Regardless of any failure of the court to recite to defendant or 
have defendant recite the facts, there is no question that 
defendant was fully aware of the facts. 
This case is similar to Jolivet v. Cook, P.2d , 
115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (1989). In Jolivet, the Supreme Court 
held that the record as a whole established that a defendant who 
attended a preliminary hearing where the evidence supporting the 
charges had been presented, was aware of the facts supporting his 
guilty plea. Here, defendant attended an entire trial before 
changing his plea to guilty. Defendant's own testimony supported 
the theft charge. He admitted accepting payment for his share of 
the ranch and knowing that meant he has no interest in the land 
(T. 127). He knew the family members/owners of the ranch, wanted 
him off of the land (T. 130). There is no question that he 
accepted money for leasing the ranch for grazing to Stirling 
Carlisle. The trial judge was convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant is guilty of theft (R. 233). There was a 
factual basis for the plea and defendant understood th^sc faoL^. 
Despite Judge Eves ruling at the time of the plea that 
there was a factual basis for it, defendant argues that the 
record as a whole does not establish that he understood what he 
had heard during the trial. He appears to assert that Rule 11, 
strictly construed, requires the judge to ask him if he 
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understood the facts. See State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 
94 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(strict compliance with Rule 11 required 
under State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)). 
Recent opinions of the Utah Supreme Court clarify State 
v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), as it relates to the 
"record as a whole" standard of review applied in a line of cases 
beginning with Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985). 
Jolivet, decided two years after Gibbons, finds that 
although the trial judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11 
when Jolivet entered his plea, 
'[t]he absence of a finding under [section 
77-35-11] is not critical so long as the 
record as a whole affirmatively establishes 
that the defendant entered his plea with full 
knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences and of the rights he was 
waiving.' State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 
(Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 
311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 
309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
115 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. Interestingly, Judge Billings of this 
Court sat in place of Justice Stewart in Jolivet. Decided prior 
to Jolivet, but after Gibbons, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 
(Utah 1988), also applies the record as a whole test. The 
Copeland court said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
M[T]here is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy \v. United States 1, 394 U.S. [459,] 
470 . . . (emphasis in the original). We 
think the most effective way to do this is to 
have a defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
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record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding• Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. 
765 P.2d at 1273 (footnote omitted). These cases make it clear 
that the test is whether the record as a whole establishes that 
the plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. This Court's 
holdings in State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), and State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), that M[s]trict, and not just substantial, compliance with 
the rule [that the examination must be by the court on the record 
at the time of the plea] is required," Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1334 
is inconsistent with recent Utah Supreme Court rulings and should 
not be followed. 
Furthermore, this "strict compliance" test is also 
inconsistent with Gibbons and other case law previously decided 
by the Supreme Court. A close reading of Gibbons reveals that 
the Court was simply pointing out the much preferred and safest 
method of determining the voluntariness of a plea. The Supreme 
Court had before it in Gibbons a transcript of the plea hearing, 
740 P.2d at 1310-11. Since the Court was able to review the 
transcript and determined that the examination of the defendant 
was inadequate, it seems likely that they would have remanded the 
case with an order that the plea be withdrawn rather than 
remanding for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness if they 
intended to impose a rule of strict Rule 11 compliance. This 
viewpoint is reinforced by Copeland's clear statement that strict 
Rule 11 compliance is not absolutely required when a guilty plea 
is otherwise voluntary. 
1 C 
The State agrees that it is much preferred to have all 
of these findings on the record at the plea hearing. In some 
cases, however, judges have overlooked certain aspects of Rule 11 
at the time of the plea. Where there is a record that 
establishes that the defendant pled voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently, it seems unnecessary to invalidate a plea simply 
because the judge overlooked parts of the Rule 11 examination in 
court. 
For example, in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 
1986), the Court held that violations of Rule 11 do not 
automatically invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea. The Court 
stated: 
A final word on the State's Rule 11 
arguments. In its zeal to set aside Kay's 
guilty pleas or renege on the bargain that 
was struck, the State has argued, in effect, 
that otherwise voluntary and lawful guilty 
pleas should always be voided when the trial 
court violates any provision of Rule 11. The 
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Hall and 
Justice Howe adopt this reasoning as well. 
This position is shortsighted, for to follow 
it would be to sanction a remedy far worse 
than the wrong. If we were to hold that any 
violation of Rule 11 automatically voids the 
resultant plea, even when the plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered, we would 
encourage defendants, convicted and sentenced 
after such a plea to attack their convictions 
for purely tactical reasons, either by direct 
appeal or by seeking habeas corpus long after 
the fact. We have refused to overturn 
convictions upon such challenges in the past 
and we find no reason to encourage such 
attacks in the future. 
Overturning such convictions—which we 
would have to do if we embraced the rationale 
advanced by the State and the Chief Justice's 
concurring opinion—would require the State 
to reprosecute numerous defendants, probably 
long after the challenged guilty pleas were 
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entered and when the passage of time would 
make reprosecution impractical, if not 
impossible. Almost certainlyf the ultimate 
result would be to free a number of convicted 
persons for nothing more than technical 
errors in the acceptance of their voluntary 
guilty pleas. 
Kay, 717 P.2d at 1301-02 (footnote and citations omitted). 
Importantly, Gibbons did not overrule Kay. Nor did it even cite 
to Kay, Miller, Brooks or Warner. Given the Utah Supreme Court's 
recent reliance on the Miller, Brooks and Warner line of cases, 
it does not appear that it was mere oversight that the Court did 
not overrule these cases. Instead, it appears that the record as 
a whole test remains viable even after Gibbons. 
It may be argued that Copeland and Jolivet represent 
cases where the Supreme Court was applying the record as a whole 
test only because the pleas were entered before Gibbons was 
decided. This argument gains some support from the Court's 
recent refusal to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons plea on the 
theory that the Gibbons decision was a clear break with the past 
and consequently not retroactive. See State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 
670, 672 n. 1 (Utah 1989) . 
Hickman, although troublesomef is not controlling when 
closely analyzed. First, it is a per curiam decision. Second, 
it ignores that the Court applied the record as a whole test in 
Jolivet after stating the Gibbons requirements but without 
distinguishing the case on the basis that it was a pre-Gibbons 
plea. The Court did not even cite Gibbons in Copeland, thus, 
indicating no concern that Gibbons was inconsistent with its 
holding. Notably, the Court does not even state the date of 
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Jolivet's plea and mentions only in passing the date of 
Copeland's plea without assigning any particular significance to 
the date. The Court's willingness to apply the record as a whole 
test in these two cases without explaining that there was any 
reason other than that it is the test to be applied indicates 
that the Court believes just that—that the test is 
voluntariness, not strict compliance with rigid Rule 11 
recitations. Were it otherwise, it is likely that the Court 
would have overruled Miller, Kay, Brooks, and Warner; or at least 
have expressly limited their application to pre-Gibbons cases. 
The Court simply has done neither and this Court should 
reconsider its rigid application of a strict Rule 11 compliance 
standard with this line of cases in mind. 
Defendant further asserts that there was confusion 
about whether he was tried for theft by deception or theft. His 
argument centers around a complaint about the manner of charging 
and filing of the information. Defects in an information are 
waived by failing to raise them prior to entry of a guilty plea. 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). Here the 
information was amended at trial to theft (R. 26). There is no 
objection in the record to that amendment. Absence of an 
objection, along with the waiver incurred by pleading guilty, 
require this Court to ignore any claim about the sufficiency of 
the information. Id. See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(b)(1) 
(1978) (Repealed July 1, 1990). 
Defendant argues that the record does not support that 
he was aware of the facts supporting his plea, nor that he 
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understood the plea agreement, because he has a hearing 
impairment. The record discloses that defendant has a hearing 
impairment (T. 8), however, the record also discloses that 
defendant's guilty plea was not rendered involuntary, unknowing 
4 
or unintelligent by that impairment. 
At no time during the trial did defendant or his 
attorneys indicate that defendant had not heard the testimony of 
any witnesses. The trial court was made aware of the hearing 
impairment at the beginning of trial and indicated the court 
would try to comply with defendant's request to increase the 
volume and decrease the tone of voice. During cross examination, 
the prosecutor asked defendant if the prosecutor was speaking 
loud enough (T. 126). Defendant responded that he was and asked 
only that he slow down. The record reveals that efforts were 
made to accommodate defendant, and defendant did not indicate any 
difficulties in hearing the testimony. Absent any complaints at 
the time of the trial, the trial court was not obliged to accept 
defendant's later claims that he could not hear the testimony of 
other witnesses. 
At the time of his plea defendant stated at one point 
that he had not heard everything that had just been said 
regarding the plea agreement. After that time, however, every 
element of the plea agreement was repeated to defendant at least 
once. See T. 176-87. Defendant's responses to the court's 
4 
The letter offered in Addendum D of Appellant's Brief 
is not part of the record and should be ignored. State v. Cook, 
714 P.2d 296, 297 (Utah 1986)(reference to matters outside the 
record are inappropriate and irrelevant and will not be 
considered). 
questions and defendant's own questions about the parameters of 
his agreement not to go onto the ranch indicate that defendant 
heard what was being said to him. Again the judge was not 
required to accept defendant's later claims that the did not hear 
what was said where the record discloses that he did. 
Defendant also argues that his guilty plea was 
involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent because the court did 
not use an affidavit. There is, however, no requirement that a 
court use a plea affidavit. There is a requirement that the 
court make a record supporting the plea, See Utah Code Ann. § 
77-35-11 (Supp. 1989)(repealed July 1, 1990), and see State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Utah 1987). The record made by the 
trial court at the time of the plea is sufficient to support the 
plea. 
Finally, defendant argues that he should be allowed to 
withdraw his plea because he did not understand that he was 
convicted of a felony as a result of his plea. The record 
discloses that he did understand this. The following occurred: 
THE COURT: All right. Now, you understand 
that if you do that, you give up your right 
to have me decide the case. There won't be 
any other opportunity to present evidence. 
You'll stand convicted of a felony until 
you've completed probation and come back to 
have the conviction wiped off your record. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. F. GENTRY: Yes. 
THE COURT: "Normal" is a relative term, but 
you appear to be in full possession of your 
faculties. You appear to understand the 
questions that I asked you. 
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MR. F. GENTRY: I do. 
THE COURT: And your answers are responsive 
to those questions. You appear to understand 
what is going on. 
Do you? 
MR. F. GENTRY: I do. I've learned a lot. 
(T. 177, 180). These exchanges indicate that defendant knew he 
was being convicted of a felony. They also clearly indicate 
that, if defendant satisfactorily completes probation, the 
conviction will be removed from his record. Regardless of what 
label trial counsel attached to the plea arrangement, the 
arrangement was adequately explained to defendant on the record 
at the time of his plea. 
The foregoing argument establishes that defendant's 
plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the 
plea. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF HIS 
CONVICTION EITHER BECAUSE HE WAIVED HIS 
CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
BY PLEADING GUILTY, OR BECAUSE COUNSEL WAS 
EFFECTIVE. 
Defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective 
for three reasons. He claims that counsel should have withdrawn 
from representing him when his codefendant received a plea 
bargain dismissing the charges against him, should have 
investigated the facts and other defenses, and should have moved 
to disqualify the trial judge. None of these claims establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
First, defendant entered a guilty plea in this case. 
If this Court affirms the order denying defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea, the Court can find that defendant's claims of 
ineffectiveness are waived. A voluntary guilty plea waives all 
claims of error occurring prior to the plea except jurisdictional 
claims. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). None 
of defendant's claims affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 
Defendant may argue that the question of whether the 
trial court should have disqualified itself is jurisdictional. 
This concept is easily discarded. While the existence of bias or 
prejudice relieves the individual judge from presiding over the 
controversy, the actual jurisdiction of the court is unaffected. 
Also, defendant makes no claim that a claim of bias and prejudice 
of the trial judge cannot be waived. 
Furthermore, the record does not establish that counsel 
was ineffective. In evaluating an ineffective counsel claim, 
this Court must determine both that counsel rendered a deficient 
performance that fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and that defendant was prejudiced by the 
performance before it may reverse defendant's conviction. State 
v. Gardner, P.2d , 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (1989); State 
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). Defendant must 
overcome a strong presumption that counsel was adequate. State 
v. Bullock, P.2d , 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36 (1989); State 
v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Prejudice 
is established where this Court's confidence in the verdict is 
undermined because there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
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different result if counsel had not performed deficiently. State 
v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Defendant has not established that it was unreasonable 
professional judgment for trial counsel not to argue that the 
1981 partition sale was void or voidable. Nor does he establish 
that there would likely have been a different result if this 
argument had been made, or if counsel had withdrawn, or the trial 
judge had been disqualified. For this reason, his conviction 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the lower court's finding that defendant's guilty plea 
was valid and deny his request for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this , L? day of February, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
• ' SANDRA Lv^JefeRfeN 
^ Assistant Attorney General 
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State of Utah, 
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v, 
Edward Day, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Garff, Billings and Davidson 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890346-CA 
F I L E D 
lfr»'. O u n * Appeals 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial. We affirm. 
Defendant was convicted by a jury of rape, a first degree 
felony. Judgment was entered on October 6, 1987. Defendant 
had been represented at trial by court-appointed defense 
counsel. Defendant did not appeal the conviction. 
On October 20, 1988, defendant, without the assistance of 
an attorney, filed a motion for new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence. The motion stated that newly discovered 
evidence indicating that the victim consented to sexual 
intercourse would be presented to the court at the time of the 
hearing. It was not accompanied by affidavits indicating the 
substance of the evidence or identifying its sources. 
Defendant noticed a hearing on the motion for November 10, 
1988. At the hearing, defendant moved the court for a 
continuance to obtain affidavits as to the new evidence. The 
motion was denied. The trial court also denied the motion for 
new trial, finding "that defendant has not complied with Utah 
Criminal Law procedures, that more than one year has lapsed 
since defendant's trial and defendant failed to file the 
necessary affidavits showing cause for new trial." Defendant 
filed c notice of appeal and a motion seeking appointment of 
counsel to pursue the appeal. The trial court granted the 
motion to appoint counsel. 
Defendant argues on appeal that (1) the motion for 
continuance should have been granted, (2) the trial court erred 
in failing to appoint legal counsel, and (3) the trial court 
erred in ruling that the motion for new trial was not timely 
filed and could not be considered. Utah R. Crim. Pro. 24 
provides, in relevant part: 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or 
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in 
the interest of justice if there is any error 
or impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for new trial shall be made in 
writing and upon notice. The motion shall be 
accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the 
essential facts in support of the motion. If 
additional time is required to procure 
affidavits or evidence the court may postpone 
the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made 
within 10 days after imposition of sentence, 
or within such further time as the court may 
fix during the ten-day period 
Defendant's motion for new trial was filed roughly one year 
after the imposition of sentence. While not disputing the 
untimeliness of the motion, defendant contends that the trial 
court erred in not considering the motion "upon its own 
initiative" under Rule 24(a). Defendant's argument is, in 
practical terms, that the trial court should have adopted his 
motion as its own, thereby relieving defendant of the time 
limit for filing the motion. Rule 24 allows a trial court to 
make its own motion for new trial based on its determination 
that such a motion is "in the interest of justice." While the 
rule contains no specific time limit for a sua sponte motion by 
the trial court, we find no basis to premise error on refusal 
to adopt defendant's untimely motion. 
The determination to grant or deny a motion for new trial 
is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be set 
aside on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. 
Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). It follows from 
Williams and the language of Rule 24 that a trial court's 
decision to make a motion for new trial on its own initiative 
is also discretionary. We conclude that under the 
circumstances of this case, it was not an abuse of discretion 
to refuse to consider a motion for new trial filed roughly one 
year after the imposition of sentence.1 Our disposition of 
the timeliness issue makes it unnecessary to consider further 
defendant's argument that he should have been granted a 
continuance to procure affidavits. 
1. The state correctly notes that defendant may seek post-
conviction relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i) on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence. 
Defendant's remaining contention on appeal is that the 
trial court should have appointed counsel to assist him in the 
motion for new trial. Appellant was assisted by 
court-appointed counsel throughout the trial in this matter. 
The order appointing counsel in June of 1987 recites that the 
attorney was "to represent the defendant in all matters 
pertinent to this action unless or until relieved by this 
court." A trial court may appoint counsel for an indigent 
criminal defendant if the defendant requests counsel or if the 
trial court "on its own motion" so orders and defendant does 
not "affirmatively waive or reject the opportunity of record to 
be represented." Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2 (Supp. 1982). 
Defendant made no request for counsel at the time he filed the 
motion for new trial, but claims that the trial court's failure 
to appoint counsel on its own motion was erroneous. It is 
undisputed that defendant did not request counsel at the time 
he filed a motion for new trial and notice of hearing. The 
next inquiry is whether defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived his right to appointed counsel. See State v. Frampton, 
737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). Although a "colloquy on the 
record" with the trial court is the preferred method of 
ascertaining the validity of a waiver, an appellate court "will 
look at any evidence in the record which shows a defendant's 
actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se", which 
"turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding 
each case." 111. at 188. The record in this case demonstrates 
that defendant knew he was entitled to appointed counsel 
because he had been represented by appointed counsel at trial. 
The motion for new trial also reflects that defendant was aware 
of the substantive requirements of a motion for new trial and, 
nevertheless, elected not to request new counsel or contact 
previous counsel tc prepare and file the documents. We 
conclude that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel, and the trial court did not err in not 
appointing counsel on its own motion. 
The order of the trial court denying a motion for new trial 
is affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
